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summary 
Public land decision making has never had an operative model. It 
hasn't worked. From colonial times through the westward movement 
to modern scientific environmentalism, decisions have left a 
trail of failure. The failures have broken people, ruined 
resources, squandered the federal budget and created deep 
divisions in the body politic. 
The resulting stalemate may be a symptom of demosclerosis, a 
progressive political disease caused by too much success by 
interest groups in accumulating and defending subsidies and 
benefits. To identify the culprit, look in the mirror. 
The solution may rest on discovering the values or theological 
differences that separate us and resolving them through discovery 
and debate. One might hope that a superior theology could 
result. The alternative, which has been honored many times in 
the history of religion, is schism. This would mean breaking up 
the public lands so that decision making would devolve upon 
smaller, more distinctly homogeneous groups. 
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OUTLINE 
I. Decision Making on the Wilderness Frontier 
A. From earliest colonial times resources at the frontier 
were free to users who were "fustest with the mostest." 
B. Settlers established rules of possession which preceded 
formal control. 
C. The squatter's pattern was to settle, establish some 
capital values, sellout and move on. 
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D. Tension between the frontier and centers of influence 
were endemic and would lead to more than one rebellion. 
E. Several of the original colonies ceded their western 
land claims to the federal government. 
F. National public land policy was established by Congress 
in the Ordinances of 1785 and 1787 and subsequent Acts. 
G. Except for a system of rectangular survey, reservation 
of lands for public purposes and plans to enrich the 
treasuries with revenues from the sale of lands, the 
occupation of western lands was planless. 
H. The Louisiana Purchase opened vistas of territorial 
advance to the Pacific. It was followed in rapid 
succession by Texas, half of the Oregon Country and a 
large part of Mexico. 
II. The Nineteenth century: An Era of Mal-administration 
A. The continuing battle between the lawmakers and 
squatters and trespassers resulted in tougher laws. 
B. congress capitulated in 1841 with a general preemption 
law recognizing squatter's rights. 
C. Difficulty in making payments for land resulted in laws 
granting relief. 
D. 1862 Homestead Act ratified the established practices: 
preemption and free land. 
E. Problems with the Homestead Act were consistently 
ignored. 
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1. Most of the lands suited to homesteading had 
already been occupied. 
2. In 1875 the Commissioner of the General Land 
Office warned that many of the unoccupied lands 
were unsuitable for cultivation. 
3. In 1878 Powell's Report on the Arid Lands 
suggested a minimum homestead of 2,560 acres for 
pastoral lands. 
4. In 1879 a Public Lands Commission suggested 
leasing or disposal of arid lands in large tracts. 
F. Congress' tolerance of the situation has several 
explanations. 
1. congress had been burned by the generous railroad 
land grants of the 1960's. 
2. Fears of monopolization of lands by syndicates 
financed by "foreign" capitalists were a common 
bogey. 
3. Local boosters were not willing to relinquish the 
dream of a countryside teeming with 160-acre 
agrarians. 
4. Desert Land Sales Act of 1877 allowed tracts of 
640 acres to be patented, an object of much abuse. 
5. Smaller plots generated more work for employees of 
the Public Land Office. 
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6. The Timber and stone Act of 1878 supplied the 
demand for timber tracts in California, oregon, 
Nevada and Washington. 
7. The 1872 Mining Act formalized procedures for 
patenting of mineral deposits. 
8. Liberalization of homestead allowances did occur, 
but not until 1909 and 1916, first to 320 acres 
and then to 640 acres. (The Kinkaid Act of 1904 
allowed 640 acre homesteads in the Sandhills of 
Nebraska.) 
9. Congress requires 60 years to respond to a 
deficiency in public land laws. 
10. Deficiencies in the laws for disposal of the 
public domain invited much fraudulent behavior and 
abuse of resources. 
11. Stockmen made a logical response to uncontrolled 
grazing by fencing the range. The Illegal 
Enclosures Act of 1885 established Congress' 
disapproval of fencing. 
III. The Evolution of Progressivism and the Gospel of Efficiency. 
A. Great surveys of the American West by Hayden, King, 
Powell, and Wheeler created much scientific interest in 
western resources. 
B. Creation of National Park reserves and forest reserves 
grew out of concern for unprotected resources. 
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C. George Perkins Marsh's Man and Nature published in 1864 
created interest in exhaustion of natural resources and 
conservation. 
D. Scientific management or "Taylorism" became widely 
influential. 
E. In 1896 a National Academy of Sciences committee 
recommended a national forestry policy. 
F. President McKinley signed the Forest Reserve Act of 
1897 creating the Bureau of Forestry in the Department 
of Agriculture with Gifford Pinchot appointed chief in 
1898. Pinchot represented scientific forestry and the 
"gospel of efficiency." 
G. "The crux of the gospel of efficiency lay in a rational 
and scientific method of making basic technological 
decisions through a single, central authority." (Hays) 
IV. The Rise and Decline of Scientific Management in the Forest 
Service. 
A. Pinchot, the master political strategist created the 
myth that the Forest Service was dedicated to 
scientific management when in reality it was dedicated 
to political management. 
B. The Forest Service had many failures by the standards 
of a scientific organization dedicated to rational 
analysis and self criticism. 
1. The predicted timber famine failed to materialize. 
Trends have been in an opposite direction 
(Clawson) . 
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2. It pushed for regulatory powers over private 
forestry, only to see parts of the industry 
surpass it some years later in regeneration 
success (Nelson 1995). 
3. Policies on fire suppression and watershed 
hydrology ignored science for many years (Schiff). 
4. It failed to read public demand for parks, 
wilderness areas and recreational use of forests. 
5. Instead of treating the multiple-use concept 
ratified by congress in the 1960 Act as a problem 
solvable by scierice, it used it as a license for 
anything it wished to do (Nelson 1995) . 
6. Its nondeclining even-flow policy led to silly and 
unreasonable timber harvesting implications 
(Nelson 1995). 
7. It became so hidebound that it had to invent an 
elaborate procedure called "new perspectives" to 
discover what it should have been learning from 
its experiences. 
8. It continues to get "dunked" by its own "witch 
hunts" (High Country News, 8 Aug, 1994). 
v. The Bureau of Land Management and the Search for 
stewardship. 
A. Western rangeland suffered the ravages of uncontrolled 
grazing except where stockmen were able to establish 
individual rights, sometimes extralegally. 
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B. Most of the damage of overgrazing had been done by 1900 
(U.S. Department of Agriculture 1902). 
c. The visions of the Homestead Act were finally abandoned 
in 1934 with the passage of the Taylor Grazing Act. 
The Grazing Service inherited a frightening melange of 
private and public rights for management. 
1. The adjudication process as overseen by grazing 
advisory boards under the Taylor Act formalized 
preference rights to grazing allotments -
occasionally using the extralegal fences to define 
allotment boundaries. 
2. The adjudication brought to the stock owners on 
the public domain formal, near proprietary rights 
which were to last for nearly 30 years (Libecap 
1981) . 
3. As a sign of stewardship investment by permittees 
in their BLM allotments was higher after 20 years 
of the Taylor Act than on Forest Service 
allotments. It may be supposed that the 
regulatory methods employed by the Forest Service 
to reduce grazing pressure also weakened private 
incentives for stewardship (Gardner 1963). 
4. Commencing in 1959 the BLM began to publicize the 
poor condition of its rangelands and to take steps 
which reduced the certainty of its permittees 
preference rights. consequently the incentives 
for stewardship were diminished (Libecap 1981). 
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5. Passage of the Federal Land Policy and Management 
Act in 1976 (FLPMA) consolidated bureaucratic 
control of the public domain grazing lands in the 
ELM. 
6. Passage of the Public Rangelands Improvement Act 
of 1978 (PRIA) further elaborated the ELM charge 
to "manage, maintain and improve the condition of 
the public rangelands so that they become as 
productive as feasible for all rangeland values." 
7. PRIA also set up an initiative to explore 
innovative grazing management policies and systems 
that might provide permittees with incentives to 
improve range conditions. Environmental interests 
objected to the program as conducted by ELM and 
the courts agreed in NRDC, Inc. v. Hodel (Huffaker 
and Gardner 1987). 
8. NRDC and the courts believe it is best to keep 
permittees under threat of cancellation or 
restriction rather than to promote permittee self-
management and secure tenure as the ELM program 
proposed to do. 
9. The opposing view was stated by Kelso in 1952: 
"As long as the public land manager 
insists on absolute liberty to 
alter the use to which grazing land 
is committed or to change the user 
to which it is rationed, the 
private firm user ... will distort 
his inputs toward short-run 
returns, including deterioration of 
the land resource." 
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v. The Illusion of Planning 
A. All of the public land agencies come under The 
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) 
requirement that the government "utilize a systematic, 
interdisciplinary approach ... in planning and decision 
making." 
B. The Forest Service derives its mandate from the 
National Forests Management Act of 1976 (NFMA) and from 
the Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning 
Act of 1974 (RPA). 
c. The BLM mandates and criteria for planning come from 
FLPMA and PRIA. 
D. Both agencies have borrowed their concepts and methods 
of planning from the schools of land use planning. 
E. Planning in both bureaus suffers from some common 
problems (Nelson 1995). 
1. It has been impossible to develop systems of 
planning that satisfy the field manager's desire 
for autonomy as well as central manager's desire 
for control. 
2. systems of national prices which could establish 
national priorities are rejected as infringing 
upon professional judgment. 
3. It has proven difficult to avoid "hollow" plans 
which skirt the critical issues and resolve 
nothing. 
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4. Planning does not control budgeting, which can 
nullify the best plans. 
5. Investment planning for resource improvements is a 
separate stage from the master plan, raising 
further issues of coordination and consistency. 
6. Congress seems disinterested in decisive agency 
planning; if it were decisive, agency planning 
would infringe upon Congressional and interest 
group powers. 
7. Planning driven by court mandates fits an 
idealized concept of decision making and offers 
little flexibility for new directions from lessons 
learned. 
VII. Advancing Demosclerosis 
A. The broadening interest in the public lands, opening of 
bureau procedures to public participation, perfection 
of the professional talents of public interest 
litigation, lobbying and fund raising have increased 
the burden of public land administration. 
B. By contrast, when Ferry Carpenter took the lead in 
drafting the first set of public land grazing 
regulations, it was between him and a group of 
livestockmen-meeting in Grand Junction, Colorado in 
1938. 
C. Demosclerosis is post war government's loss of the 
ability to experiment and to adapt. It is directly 
related to the rise of a "large, sophisticated, 
professionalized, and to a considerable extent self-
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serving" industry dedicated to accumulating and 
defending subsidies and benefits (Rauch 1994). 
D. Many of the difficulties of public land decision making 
are indicative of demosclerosis. 
E. The ongoing experience with Range Reform '94 is 
symptomatic of the disease. After some false starts 
due to pressure tactics, a detailed package was 
released and coalition began to work out some details 
only to result in eventual stalemate (High Country 
News, 1993 and 1994, especially June 27, 1994) 
F. The ruling paradigm of public land management, the 
progressive faith or scientific management, may invite 
demosclerosis due to its logical inconsistencies. 
VIII. Scientific or Free Choice Environmentalism? 
A. Scientific management has been adopted by the 
environmental movement to such an extent and 
environmentalism has been sufficiently adopted by the 
bureaus that we can speak of scientific 
environmentalism as a dominant preference in public 
land management (see Loomis). 
B. Scientific environmentalism has faith in science and 
public administration. It supports professionalism, 
decisive planning and bureaucratic control of the 
public lands in the public interest, with oversight 
from the judiciary as needed. 
C. Scientific environmentalism suffers the same flaws as 
the progressive movement. 
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It cannot accommodate the daily reality of political 
interference. 
It cannot recognize that the public interest exists 
only as a collection of private interests. 
1. It is a logical impossibility because it cannot be 
justified economically. As practiced it rejects 
economic science. 
D. A free choice model for management of the public lands 
offers an alternative to the scientific model. 
1. It would recognize that the public lands user is 
the ultimate manager of the resource and it would 
seek systems of rights that would give the user 
secure opportunities to manage resources on the 
public lands. 
2. In the free choice model grazing permits would be 
freely transferable (Gardner 1962, 1963) 
3. Range Reform '94 makes a beginning by broadening 
the eligibility conditions for holding a grazing 
allotment and by broadening the uses which can be 
made of the forage on the allotment. 
4. Range Reform '94 also contains the potential to 
greatly weaken the allotment holders' security of 
tenure and consequently their incentives to be 
good stewards. This continues a trend of the past 
30 years with BLM permits and of 95 years with 
Forest Service permits. 
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5. The free choice model would look for ways to 
enfranchise a wider variety of user classes for 
the hands-on management of allotments. 
6. Free choice approaches range science with humility 
as lacking the answers to issues of range health 
and sustainable forage management. 
7. It recognizes that the properly enfranchised user 
has a low cost system for gathering information on 
range management and developing management 
strategies. It encourages a diversity of 
management systems, which induces a greater 
accumulation of knowledge. 
8. The free choice model elevates private decision 
making and initiative to a prominent role in 
public land management. 
9. Public land management by the states has generally 
placed more reliance on private operators than 
does the federal model and it has produced net 
revenues for the state treasuries. 
IX. A Question of Theological Differences 
A. Public land decisions are in considerable degree 
decisions about social values. If we cannot have a set 
of scien'ce based prices that reflect social values, 
then all decisions become political decisions which 
strike a balance among competing values. 
B. As a matter of choosing among alternative values, 
political decisions begin to deal with theology, albeit 
a mostly secular theology. 
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c. Public lands decisions have been affected in the past 
two centuries by many of the great secular theologies. 
1. Agrarian fundamentalism. 
2. Manifest destiny. 
3. Populism. 
4. Scientific management. 
5. Conservation and the gospel of efficiency. 
6. Park preservation. 
7. Wilderness preservation. 
8. Deep ecology. 
9. Biological conservation. 
10. Sustainability. 
D. Faith in scientific environmentalism or in free choice 
environmentalism is based on theology. 
E. until we can discuss the theology of public land 
management and make a choice among competing theologies 
that will seem to lead to a better path, we will 
continue to stew in a divisive, costly, damaging muddle 
of decisions on public land management. 
F. In the end we may decide upon the course of breaking up 
the public lands into separate fiefdoms. Schism is a 
time-honored response to irreconcilable religious 
differences. 
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